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A parent’s death can have a lasting impact on a child’s outcomes. This paper analyzes the 
effect of parental death on a child’s workforce participation, education, marital status and health, 
and a household’s consumption. I compare outcomes for if a mother passes away versus if a father 
passes away, and for girls versus boys. I run traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, 
but recognize that endogeneity and identification problems may cause OLS estimates to be biased. 
I therefore use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) in an attempt to mitigate misattribution, and 
estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) 
for each dependent variable. I compare these PSM results to those from OLS regressions. I find 
that on average, parental death leads to worse outcomes on most indicators of a child’s wellbeing. 
A parent’s death has a larger and more negative effective on a daughter’s outcomes than a son’s. 
The data presents worse effects on a child from a mother passing away on some indicators, and 
worse outcomes from a father passing away on others. 
 
II. Introduction 
Parental death is a life-changing shock. In addition to the psychological and emotional toll on 
the remaining household members, a parent’s death also has measurable, lasting impact on one’s 
socioeconomic wellbeing indicators. This paper explores the short term (5-9 years after death) 
effects on a child of losing a parent in India. I measure the impact on a child’s likelihood to be 
working, school enrollment, grades of education completed, likelihood to get married, and the 
number of days a child was sick in the 30-day period before the data gathering interview was 
conducted. I also look at the effect of parental death on a household’s monthly consumption per 
capita. 
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While I do regress my chosen outcomes using the OLS model, an OLS regression can result 
in biased estimates of independent variables because of endogeneity, which the model can suffer 
from when an explanatory variable, such as parental death, is correlated with the error term, which 
might include uncontrolled confounders that may have an effect on the dependent variable and 
also be correlated with both independent and dependent variables in a model. For example, one 
can imagine a scenario in which a parent suffered from mental illness, which created an unsafe 
environment for a child to grow up in and thus reduced the amount of education attained by the 
child. Parental mental illness may have increased the likelihood of the parent to die to die, but it 
may also have caused the child to receive less education than a child with a mentally healthy 
parent. Using OLS, one attempts to balance observations on observed independent variables, but 
cannot be sure that observations are balanced on other unobserved, relevant factors. Households 
which are likely to lose a parent may be different from households which do not lose a parent, so 
I use propensity score matching to compare households which lost a parent to ones which did not, 
by matching treatment and control households on observable variables. I then compare these 
outcomes to those per OLS regressions. 
I define children as those 18 or younger in round 1, and treatment as losing a parent between 
rounds 1 and 2. I try to carefully build treatment and control groups that are balanced on 
observables by construction, and hopefully on unobservables in the end as well. At the time of the 
first round of surveys (Table 1: Round 1 Summary Statistics, Treatment v Control), those in the 
eventually treated group were more likely to lose a parent. The treated children were on average 2 
years older and lived in households with 500 rupees/capita more debt, compared to those in the 
control group. The parents of the treated were also older. Mothers on average were 5 years older 
and fathers on average were 6 years older for treated children, compared to parents of the control. 
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Parents of the treated were more likely to be using tobacco/alcohol, and were diagnosed with 
serious illnesses such as cancer, diabetes, heart disease and tuberculosis more often than the 
parents of the control children, with fathers of the treated group being diagnosed with a serious 
illness three times as often as those of the control. Because the treated households are significantly 
different from the control households, it would be incorrect to assume that treatment was randomly 
assigned to the sample, and the data would be biased if I did. Counterintuitively, parents of the 
treated, on average, had one more year of education than parents of the control, though as one 
might expect, the mothers had less education than the fathers – about one year less for both the 
treatment and control mothers. 
A second treatment level I investigate is the effect of a mother’s death versus a father’s death. 
I compare the summary descriptive statistics (Table 2: Round 1 Summary Statistics, Treated – 
Mother Died v Father Died) of the children who lost a mother between rounds 1 and 2 to those 
who lost a father. Those who lost a mother were, on average, one year younger, lived in slightly 
larger households, had mothers who were diagnosed with serious illnesses three times more often, 
had a mother who had completed about 0.80 years less schooling, and had 50 rupees of a lower 
monthly household consumption per capita. Those who lost a father were on average one year 
older, had fathers who had been diagnosed with serious illnesses almost 4 times more often, were 
in households with 1,460 rupees/capita of greater debt, and had fathers about 3.5 years older. 
Counterintuitively, those who lost a mother had mothers who were 1.74 years younger on average. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section III is a review of the existing literature about the 
effect of parental death on children’s socioeconomic well being indicators. Section IV describes 
the IHDS dataset used. Section V describes the regression models used, including a background 
of propensity score matching. Section VI describes the results, Section VII explains the 
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shortcomings of this paper and avenues for further research, and Section VIII concludes. Section 
IX presents summary statistics and regression tables. 
 
III. Literature Review 
Studies show how parental death can contribute to a child’s future outcomes, and that it is not 
a trivial problem. I estimate the effect of parental death on a child’s wellbeing outcomes, including 
workforce participation, enrollment in school, education level completed, marital status, health, 
the household’s expenditure on the child’s education, and the household’s monthly income per 
capita. In this section I review the existing economics literature for commonly accepted theories 
and mechanisms by which parental death affects a child’s future outcomes. I also look at evidence 
for a difference in the effect of the death of a mother versus the death of a father, and the difference 
in the effect of parental death on a girl-child versus the effect on a boy-child. The number of years 
which have passed between a parent’s death and the measurement of an outcome also help 
determine the magnitude of the effect. Previous researchers have noted that the more time that has 
elapsed since parental death, the more adapted and recovered a household may be from the initial 
shock. The literature also points to a difference in the effect of parental death on younger children 
versus on adult/near-adult children. 
Cosic and Deb (2010) examine the effects of adult mortality on education, health and food. 
They look at how the HIV/AIDS epidemic of 2003 in the South African province of KwaZulu-
Natal claimed 47% of deaths overall, and 71% of deaths in the 15-49 age strata. The authors use 
the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) panel dataset, which follows 1,377 
households originally surveyed in 1993 under the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and 
Development, in 1998 and 2004. Cosic and Deb find that a death in a household decreases that 
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household’s consumption of food and education, but find no impact on healthcare expenditure. 
Furthermore, the authors find no difference between the effect of mother death and father death, 
which they attribute to a lack of statistical power, rather than claiming no significant difference in 
effect of mother versus father death. 
Cosic and Deb use a difference-in-difference (DID) design to take into account possible 
systematic differences between origin households and their split-off households. They are able to 
use a DID design because they have three rounds of data, and thus are able to better de-trend and 
account for the different rates at which outcomes of treated and control households change than I 
am. My dataset has only two rounds, which may result in biased conclusions if I use a DID design, 
because even if I subtract out different starting points, treated households may be on a different 
trend line than control households. However, I am able to further Cosic and Deb’s work because 
unlike the KIDS dataset they use, the IHDS dataset allows me to estimate the difference between 
the effect of a mother’s death versus a father’s death. 
One repeated finding is that when children are not enrolled in school, they are not 
necessarily out of work (idle), and when a child is working, s/he has not necessarily dropped out 
of school. Bhatty (1998) notes that a child might concurrently be attending school and working, 
while another might be neither attending school, nor working. Maitra and Ray (2002), Rosati and 
Tzannatos (2006), and Das (2016) account for the four different combinations of enrollment and 
work, ranked highest to lowest based on the child’s welfare: enrolled and do not work, enrolled 
and work, neither enrolled nor work, and not enrolled and work. Seck (2010) uses a multinomial 
logit model to estimate children’s school enrollment and workforce participation activities before 
and after they lose a parent. Das (2016) found that school enrollment of older (ages 12 to 18) one-
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parent children was significantly lower than for older dual-parent children. Those left with only a 
father were the least likely to be enrolled. 
When a parent passes away, a household may reallocate its dispensable income. Das (2016) 
discusses the effect of single parenthood on education-related inputs among school-aged children 
in India. He found one-parenthood was associated with significantly higher education expenditures 
among younger (ages 6-11) children, but no significant effect existed for older children. Separated 
or divorced mothers on average spent less on education than the other parent groups. Das also 
found that education-related expenditures were lowest for children with only a father. 
Whereas Das (2016) only had round 1 of the IHDS dataset available, I further his research 
by using round 2 data to create a panel dataset. His was cross-sectional data and thus he was unable 
to attribute any causality to single-parenthood. Furthermore, the effects of a mortality shock to a 
household are more fleshed out over time, and the 5-9 years between the two rounds of surveys 
allow me to account for this. While I hope that I reduce potentially unobserved heterogeneity and 
selection biases by matching on as many relevant variables as I can identify using propensity score 
matching, I cannot be 100% sure that the observations in the control and treatment groups are 
balanced. I do not know whether unobserved variables such as parent’s mental health or family’s 
level of dysfunctionality are also correlated with the observed variables, as my dataset does not 
include such variables. 
A household may need to rely on an additional set of earning hands after the loss of a 
breadwinner and/or caretaker of children. Das notes older (ages 12-18) children of widows are the 
most likely to be working. He found one-parenthood to be associated with a significantly higher 
probability of working and not being enrolled in school, among this group of older children. 
Throughout the world, and especially so in developing countries, girls are well documented to 
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be treated as second-tier citizens and discriminated against compared to boys. Cameron and 
Worswick (2001) and Rose (1999) show that because women’s labor market opportunities are 
already limited in developing countries like India, daughters, compared to sons, bear a 
disproportionate burden from negative shocks to a household, such as the death of a parent. 
 
IV. Data 
I used the India Human Development Survey panel dataset put together by the University of 
Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), a New Delhi based 
nonprofit economics think tank. The IHDS includes two rounds of nationally representative 
surveys across India, covering various topics including health, education and economics. 
Round 1 data was collected between November 2004 and October 2005. It includes 215,754 
individuals across 41,554 households, from 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighborhoods in 33 
states and union territories of India. Round 2 data was collected between January 2011 and May 
2013. It includes 204,569 individuals across 42,152 households, from 1,420 villages and 1,042 
urban neighborhoods in all states and union territories of India with the exception of the Andaman 
and Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands. 
The merged dataset is made of 150,988 individuals from 40,018 households. In urban blocks 
and rural areas of northeastern states where 5 or more IHDS households were lost to attrition, 
interviewers were asked to inform NCAER of this loss, and after a loss was verified by a physical 
visit, a replacement household was randomly selected from the same neighborhood the missing 
household was located in. This led to 2,134 new, replacement households being included in the 
IHDS-II sample. 
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Based on the date ranges of when interviews were conducted, second round interviews must 
be at least 5 years after a first round interview, and at most, 9 years could have elapsed between 
the two rounds. Of 52,958 children in round 2 who are coded as having been 18 or younger in 
round 1, I find and drop 4,606 (8.70%) who are coded as having been interviewed in round 2 
outside of this time range – either too much or too little time is coded as having elapsed since the 
individual was first interviewed in round 1. 8.08% of the 4,606 individuals I drop are coded as 
having lost a parent between rounds 1 and 2, whereas only 5.27% of the children I keep in the 
analysis are coded as having lost a parent between the two rounds. If ages had been correctly 
coded, one might anticipate that the effect of parental death on a child’s outcomes would be even 
larger and more negative. For the subset of individuals that I do analyze, I am left with 48,352 
children who were 18 or younger in round 1. 20,813 (43.04%) of these children are girls. 637 
(0.01%) children lost a mother, 1,861 lost a father (0.04%) and 48 lost both. 
I create a morbidity indicator variable, using a morbidity scale which ranges from 0 to 15, for 
how many serious illnesses a parent suffers from and has been diagnosed with, i.e. cancer, diabetes, 
heart disease and tuberculosis. I also create a Sanitation Index, a range from 0 to 3, with one point 
each for if a person uses a toilet (versus defecating in “open fields”), if the person washes her/his 
hands after defecation, and if the person uses soap to wash hands after defecation. 
 
V. Model, Regression Analyses 
For the purposes of this paper, I first generate a variable treatment that is equal to 1 for those 
individuals 18 years of age or younger (whom I refer to as children) in round 1 of the IHDS survey, 
who lose a parent between rounds 1 and 2 of the survey. When randomization of a treatment such 
as parental death is not possible, propensity score matching serves as a substitute, by creating a 
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subgroup of observations that can serve as a control group comparable to the treated observations, 
based on similarity on the observed independent variables. Per Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
matching on a single “index” such as the propensity score can just as effectively calculate the 
treatment effect, as matching on all variables. 
Using PSM, first assigns each individual a likelihood of being treated, which in this case means 
losing a parent between rounds 1 and 2. Then I compare those children who were treated with 
those who have a similar/the closest propensity score, but were part of the control group. PSM 
compares treated households to control households, by a household’s probability of parental death. 
There may be something different about households which end up losing a parent when compared 
to households that do not lose a parent. For example, one might hypothesize that a treated 
household is likely poorer, has less educated parents, and has parents who work in more hazardous 
occupations such as manual labor or in manufacturing/industrial settings, compared to control 
households, which may be wealthier on average, and have parents who work desk or corporate 
jobs such as lawyers or accountants. 
Dahejia and Wahba (2002) discuss propensity score matching methods, which in the late 1990s 
were a relatively new econometric tool available to control for sample bias. They define a 
propensity score as the probability of receiving treatment, conditional on covariates. To isolate the 
true, unbiased estimate of treatment on the treated, the outcome in the control group should be 
independent of whether an observation received treatment. 
One matches an observation in the treatment group to an observation in the control group, 
based on whether the control observation’s propensity score is reasonably close to that of the 
treated observation. There are three main methods to choose from: (i) matching with replacement, 
under which one matches a treated observation to a control one and then includes that matched 
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control observation back in the pool to choose from, for the next treated observation to be matched, 
(ii) nearest neighbor, under which one matches a treated observation to a control observation based 
on which control observation has the closest propensity score to the treated observation, and (iii) 
caliper matching, under which one builds groups of control observations which fall within a range 
of propensity score radii, and then uses all of the control units within this range as comparables for 
a set of treated outcomes also within this same range of propensity score radii. 
If one matches without replacement, each treated observation is matched to a unique control 
observation based on the nearest propensity score. While using more comparison units increases 
the precision of estimates, it also results in increased bias. If one compares each treatment 
observation to a unique control observation, one has come up with the smallest difference in 
propensity score between the treatment and comparison observations. However, if there are only 
a few observations in the control group, one may be forced to match with units with large 
differences in propensity scores. 
Each individual has two potential outcomes – one if the individual is treated (parental death in 
this case), and the other if the individual is not. An individual’s treatment effect is the difference 
between these two potential outcomes. However, because an individual cannot concurrently be 
treated and left untreated, one instead calculates the average treatment effect (ATE), which is the 
average effect of treatment across the entire population. This includes the effect of treatment on 
those who were treated, plus the estimated effect of treatment on those who were not treated, had 
they been treated. The average outcome among the treated is the counterfactual for the average 
among the control observations (Holland, 1986). The ATE is the difference between this mean of 
the outcomes of the treated and the mean of the outcomes of the control observations. I also 
calculate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), which is simply the effect of 
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treatment only for those children who actually received treatment. To use propensity score 
matching, one must assume that the distribution of potential outcomes and of observed and 
unobserved characteristics, the covariates, are the same for both control and treatment households, 
and that the distributions of observed and unobserved characteristics are independent of each other. 
I also add mother death and father death as additional treatments, to measure the differences 
in the effect of a mother’s death versus a father’s death. I compare the effect of each of these types 
of parental death with parent death of the other gender, as well as with the control, which in this 
case is the children who lost no parents plus the children who lost a parent of the opposite gender. 
Finally, I interact being a female child and treatment, to measure the effect of parental death on 
girls versus on boys. 
I use the teffects psmatch command in STATA, which accepts a continuous, binary, count, 
fractional, or non-negative outcome. The more variables (“dimensions”) on which one needs to 
match control and treatment observations, the more difficult it becomes to find comparable 
individuals, because one is looking for two people who are similar on more and more criteria. 
Using a PSM model, one can only hope that the observations in the control and treatment groups 
are balanced, but cannot be sure whether the unobserved variables are correlated with the observed 
variables. I use PSM because I am concerned that unobserved characteristics of a household may 
lead the estimates of the effect of the observed characteristics to be biased, and might over or 
under-attribute effects to death. 
For example, a dysfunctional family, an unobserved variable, might increase the likelihood of 
a parent’s death, an independent variable, but might also decrease the level of education a child 
attains. The independent variables should be exogenous, and the effect of the unobserved variable 
on the dependent variable should be attributed to dysfunctionality of family, not incorrectly to an 
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independent variable such as parental death. When the unobserved effect is large and negative, so 
is the error term, as well as the incorrect attribution of the effect of the unobserved variable to one 
of the observed independent variables such as parental death. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions may be biased because treatment in an OLS model 
is endogenous, and thus may misinterpret the effects from other unobserved variables, as an effect 
of parental death. While controlling for covariates can, for example, account for differences in 
income among households, controlling for income will not account for unobservables such as the 
difference in ability of low versus high income households to cope with death, as one is unable to 
measure variables such as ability. One might hypothesize that a high income household might have 
a cushion and thus be able to better cope with death, but it is also plausible that a household which 
loses a high income earner might be ill-equipped to cope with death because it had always relied 
upon the earning parent, unlike in lower income households, which might not have relied heavily 
on any one household member. 
If one thinks of death as a treatment, an OLS regression may suffer from a selection bias. 
Households may have been selected into treatment by factors such as dysfunctionality of a family 
or parents suffering from mental health problems, that also affect a child’s educational outcomes. 
If selection bias does exist, then when one compares treated households (ones which suffered from 
a parental death) to control households (ones with no parental death loss), one would have a larger 
representation of dysfunctional households or parents suffering from mental health issues in the 
treated sample, so the control and treated groups would no longer be balanced. Propensity score 
matching attempts to balance these two groups as much as possible, by balancing more specifically 
on observables; one hopes that this fine grain matching also aligns the data on unobservables. 
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It could also be that parental death has no direct impact on outcomes, but mental illness both 
increases probability of parental death and also leads to worse outcomes. One might think parental 
death is causal, but it may just be a spurious correlation, because parental mental illness is 
unobserved. Such correlations between an observed independent variable and the dependent 
variable may be incorrect because of the unobserved independent variables. For example, a child 
who lived in a dysfunctional family and/or with a mentally ill parent may have already been likely 
to attain fewer years of education than a child in a functional family with a mentally healthy parent, 
so it would be incorrect for one to conclude that parental death caused the reduction in school 
grades completed, when in fact it was bound to happen regardless of parental death. 
One can attempt to mitigate biases that stems from endogeneity by using a 2-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) regression, which uses an instrumental variable (IV). An IV can be used when 
both an independent and dependent variable are correlated with the error term, causing omitted 
variable bias. An OLS model would give biased results in such an instance. An instrument is 
correlated with an explanatory independent variable, but not with the ultimate dependent variable. 
In stage 1 of a 2SLS regression, the instrument is used as an independent variable to estimate the 
variable that was previously endogenous, which in turn is eventually used as an independent 
variable in stage 2 to estimate the ultimate dependent variable. I do not use an instrumental variable 
and a 2SLS regression because I was unable to identify any plausible instruments which may cause 
parental death, but not be correlated with any of my ultimate dependent variables, a child’s 
workforce participation, education, marital status, health, and a household’s per capita 
consumption. 
A difference-in-difference (DID) model might be suitable in overcoming biases, but it rests on 
the strong assumption that the effect of the unobserved variable(s) is time invariant, and that the 
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error term is a fixed constant. However, if effects change or are being multiplied over time, the 
method does not work. The change in household outcomes between rounds 1 and 2 might be 
different between treatment and control groups, even if the treatment group had not been treated. 
The PSM method uses a different approach, based on the idea that if one can create synthetic 
treatment and control groups and match and balance households in a fine grain way on observables, 
then one may also be matching and balancing on unobservables. 
For the purposes of this paper, I am restricting myself to only variables that theoretically matter 
in determining one’s outcomes, not the demographic variables caste or religion, which do not 
inherently make someone more likely to lose a parent or determine one’s socioeconomic 
wellbeing. I include caste and religion in the descriptive statistics for both the control and treatment 
groups, but deem them unnecessary in my regressions because one’s religion and caste should not 
decide one’s income, education or health outcomes. Socioeconomic background is captured by 
other independent variables such as per capita household income in round 1. 
 
VI. Results 
I use 0.05 (5%) as my lowest p-value significance threshold, not 10%. Many of my independent 
variables are significant not just at the 5% level, but also at the 1% and 0.1% thresholds. Only 
coefficients of significant variables are presented below. 
The average treatment effect of the death of a parent across all households (Table 3: PSM 
(ATE)) causes a child to be 8% more likely to be working, 8% less likely to be enrolled in school, 
2% less likely to be married, and results in a child completing 0.34 years less schooling than if a 
child did not lose a parent. Treatment does not have a significant effect on monthly consumption 
per capita. A treatment household may already have not singularly relied upon the deceased parent 
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for income, and responsibilities may have already rested on other members, including the children 
of the household. 
The average treatment effect of losing a parent on the treated (Table 4: PSM (ATET)) children 
results in a child being 6% more likely to be working, 8% less likely to be enrolled in school, 2% 
less likely to be married, and on average causes a child to finish 0.47 fewer years of schooling than 
untreated children. One might expect the negative effects of losing a parent to be more acute upon 
limiting the ATE to only the treated. However, there does not seem to be a big difference between 
the ATE and ATET. The effect of treatment is still not significant on consumption/capita, nor on 
education expenditure. 
It might seem counterintuitive that parental death causes a child to be less likely to be married. 
On the one hand, one might assume that a household would more quickly want to bring a daughter-
in-law into the household as she could provide a set of helping hands, and more quickly give a 
daughter’s hand away in marriage so that in a country like India, the daughter is not a continuing 
“burden” or “drag” on the household, as is sometimes claimed. But this phenomenon may be 
explained partially by the practice of dowry, as a family that is likely to and/or has lost a parent 
may not be well off, and thus may not yet be able to afford to pay a dowry because of the loss of 
a/the breadwinner. 
The ATE of losing a mother (Table 5: PSM (ATE: Mother Deceased v All Other)) compared 
to either losing neither parent, or losing a father, is worse. A child is 6% more likely to participate 
in the workforce, 7% less likely to be enrolled in school, and on average, completes 0.52 fewer 
years of schooling than those children who have neither lost a parent or lost a father. When a 
mother dies, a household, on average, also spends almost 2,000 rupees less on a child’s education. 
Mother death does not have a significant effect on consumption per capita, marriage rates, or 
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sickness. The ATET of losing a mother (Table 6: PSM (ATET: Mother Deceased v All Other)) is 
significant for the same variables and in the same directions as the ATE, except for the ATET of 
parental death on education expenditure, which is no longer significant. Compared to those 
children who do not lose a mother, children which lose a mother are 8% more likely to be working, 
8% less likely to be enrolled in school, and complete, on average, 0.57 years fewer of schooling. 
The ATE of losing a father (Table 7: PSM (ATE: Father Deceased v All Other)), when 
compared to the sample of children who lose neither parent or lose a mother, is worse. A child is 
4% more likely to work, 5% less likely to be enrolled in school, and, on average, completes 0.29 
fewer grades of school. The ATET among those who lost a father (Table 8: PSM (ATET: Father 
Deceased v All Other)) is that children are 5% more likely to work, 7% less likely to be enrolled 
and complete 0.39 fewer grades of school. The ATET on marital status turns significant, and those 
children who have lost a father are 3% less likely to be married. 
I then restrict my dataset to only the treated households, in order to compare the ATE and 
ATET for those children who lost a mother with the children who lost a father. The ATE of losing 
a mother when compared to losing a father (Table 9: PSM (ATE: Mother Deceased v Father 
Deceased)) is not significant on any outcome variable. The ATET (Table 10: PSM (ATET: Mother 
Deceased v Father Deceased)) of losing a mother, on the other hand, compared to losing a father, 
is significant and negative on multiple outcome variables. A child is 9% more likely to be working, 
9% less likely to be enrolled in school, completes 0.64 fewer years of school, and is 5% less likely 
to be married. A household which loses a mother also has 474 rupees less in monthly consumption 
per capita in round 2. 
The ATE of losing a father when compared to losing a mother (Table 11: PSM (ATE: Father 
Deceased v Mother Deceased)) results in a child completing 0.54 years fewer of schooling, but is 
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not significant on any other variable. Similarly, the ATET (Table 12: PSM (ATET: Father 
Deceased v Mother Deceased)) results in a child completing 0.96 fewer years of schooling, but is 
not significant on any other variable. 
The last PSM regressions I run include the interaction between my original treatment, parental 
death, and with a child being female. I do this to measure the difference in outcomes for girls 
versus boys. Being a girl (Table 13: PSM (ATE: Female Child*Parent Deceased v All Other)) 
results in 4% lower enrollment in school when treated and a 2% greater likelihood of getting 
married by the time of the round 2 survey, compared to being a boy. The ATET (Table 14: PSM 
(ATET: Female Child*Parent Deceased v All Other)) shows an 8% lower likelihood of working 
and 5% lower rate of enrollment for girls who lost a parent, compared to boys who lost a parent. 
The inequality of ATE and ATET across the regressions I run shows that treatment was not 
really random, and those households who lost a parent were, on average, more likely to lose a 
parent. 
I also run OLS regressions (Table 15: OLS Regressions), which do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The effect of treatment on school grades completed is negative, as one might expect. 
Those children who lost a mother are less likely to be enrolled in school and spend less on 
education than both the control children, and those who lost a father. Girls, relative to boys, are in 
households with 95 rupees less in monthly per capita consumption. 1,077 rupees less is spent on 
education, a girl is 3% more likely to be married, and sick 0.13 days more often in the past 30 
days. However, a silver lining is that a girl is also 13% less likely to be working, 1% more likely 
to be enrolled in school, and, on average, completes 0.29 grades more of school. 
Parents’ education level positively and significantly affects a household’s consumption per 
capita. A child in a rural household is better off than in an urban one, except that s/he is more likely 
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to work than a child in an urban household. Practicing good hygiene and sanitation results in a 
positive effect on a household’s consumption per capita. Counterintuitively, having electricity 
results in a household spending almost 1,800 rupees less on the education of a child who loses 
her/his parent, and results in the child, on average, to be 1% less likely to be enrolled in school. 
The effect of treatment on consumption per capita is not significant. One possible reason why 
treatment may not be a significant covariate of consumption per capita in round 2 may be that short 
term consumption is not affected by parental death, because a household which is more likely to 
lose a parent may already be less reliant on that parent’s contribution to the household’s 
consumption needs. However, future consumption may be at risk, because lower school enrollment 
rates married with greater workforce participation for children who lose a parent may result in 
worse long term outcomes compared to those children with two parents who stay in school and 
out of the workforce longer. 
It is interesting to compare the PSM results to those from the OLS regressions. The ATE of 
parental death on a child’s workforce participation is 8%, but only 6% per OLS. Children are 8% 
less likely to be enrolled in school per PSM, but only 6% less likely per OLS. Per PSM, a child, 
on average, completes 0.34 years less schooling if s/he loses a parent, but 0.52 years fewer per 
OLS regressions. OLS regressions understate the negative effect of parental death on a child’s 
workforce participation and school enrollment, and do not fully capture the fewer years of 
schooling a child attains upon losing a parent, when compared to estimates per PSM regressions. 
Education expenditure and sickness in the 30 days before interview are not significant per PSM, 
but per OLS, a household spends 1,107 rupees more on a child who loses a parent, and children 
were sick 0.15 days more in the past 30 days if they had lost a parent. Both PSM and OLS show 
that parental death leads to a child being married 2% less often than a child with both parents. 
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VII. Further Research and Shortcomings 
Dahejia and Wahba (2016) point out that propensity scores are only as valid as the selection 
of observable covariates, because relevant unobserved variables may result in biases. While I hope 
that the control and treated groups are balanced on unobserved variables, I cannot be sure that this 
is the case. I am unable to include intangibles such as ability, as independent variables. One 
drawback of the propensity score matching model is that unlike with true randomization, variables 
which cannot be observed such as preferences and values may cause bias from incorrect 
attribution. Short of conducting a randomized control trial, the PSM model is a second-best method 
of balancing the sample on the observable variables. 
The University of Maryland and NCAER are working on publishing a third round of interviews 
with the IHDS households. The length of time elapsed in between the two rounds of the IHDS was 
as little as 5 years for some households, and as much as 9 years for others. While this data allows 
me to draw a causal relationship between different independent variables and the observed 
outcome variables in the short term, I am unable to analyze the medium to long term effects of 
one-parenthood on a child’s outcomes. Das (2016) notes that one-parenthood is not strictly a one-
time shock, but rather, a process in which the remaining parent and household members try 
different strategies over time to adjust and adapt to the shock. Future research on the medium-term 
lasting effects of parental death can be conducted using the anticipated IHDS-III dataset. To 
measure long term effects, researchers would have to follow these children over their lifetimes. 
Literature has shown that the effect of parental death varies between outcomes for children 
who are infants and adolescents, versus for those who are teenagers and older. However, I leave it 
to future researchers to look further into this in the India context. I also do not compare the effect 
of parental death for those children who lost both parents between the two rounds, with the effect 
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on those children who either lost one parent or no parents. 48 children lost both parents between 
rounds 1 and 2.  
Households which have lost a parent between round 1 and round 2 of the IHDS may have been 
more likely to drop out of the survey, and the replacement households may not be random nor 
perfect matches for those who dropped out, so the effects of (possible) parental death in these 
households may not be captured, and thus the effects of treatment I have found may be understated. 
One could also look at just the first round of surveys and attempt to estimate the likelihood of a 
parent dying, and/or the likelihood of a household dropping out of the survey in round 2, as one 
might imagine a scenario in which those households more likely to drop out may also be the ones 
more at risk of losing a parent. 
There may be a possibility of measurement error in my dataset, as I may be incorrectly 
estimating deaths. 5.17% of people in my dataset are coded as having died between the two rounds 
of interviews. Death may be overstated if a parent was coded as dead but in reality did not die, and 
may have instead left the household. For example, a surveyed woman may have been embarrassed 
to tell an interviewer that her husband had left her, and a father may thus incorrectly be coded as 
dead, when really he should have been coded as missing/separated/divorced. The effect of a 
missing parent on a child may be similar to that of a dead one. I do not isolate the effect of a single-
parent household due to parental death versus a single-parent household due to a migrant parent. 
As Kovac (2017) has shown, the effect of a missing father is large and negative on children’s 
wellbeing outcomes. Further research can analyze the effect on a household of a missing father 
due to death, versus, for example, a household with a father who is missing because he works in a 
distant city to support his family, and thus sees his children infrequently. 
	 23	
Parental death may also be overstated because of the types of households more likely to take a 
long, two-hour survey. Poorer households may have been more likely to agree to answer long 
surveys because of a lower opportunity cost relative to more well-off households, and thus poorer 
households, which are correlated with a higher chance of having lost a parent, might be 
overrepresented in the survey. 
I also do not look at the effect of a parent’s death on the remaining parent or any other members 
of the household. It is plausible that the consumption patterns of a remaining parent, grandparent, 
or other non-own-child household member may change, to try and mitigate any negative effects 
on a child/children who lost the parent, but this remains to be examined in further research. 
Similarly to Cosic and Deb’s research, my study “is silent on [the] distribution of impacts among 
surviving individuals in the households.” 
Future researchers can build upon my work by also analyzing if children get adopted into 
another household after parental death, and if so, how outcomes of children vary for a) children 
who did not lose a parent, b) children who lost a parent and were not adopted, c) children who lost 
a parent and were adopted into another household, and d) existing children in the households that 
adopt a child who lost a parent. 
Even if a child with two parents and a child with a single parent both attend school, the quality 
of education available to each child may be different, and the quality of job the two children may 
get hired for in the future may also be different. These factors may also not have been fully captured 
by my included covariates. Due to unavailability of data, I also did not include variables which 
could help a household cope with death, such as an extended family or government assistance 
because of parental death. 
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I also would have liked to examine any straining of relationships caused by parental death, 
both within and outside a household. While family often serves as a support system, the child’s 
relationships with other remaining household members may deteriorate. I would have also liked 
to run ordinal logistic regressions to measure the effect of treatment on the different combinations 
of workforce participation and school enrollment a child can have. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Parental death can have significant negative effects on a child in the short, medium and long 
term. Propensity score matching is a method which, under the right circumstances, helps to reduce 
potential estimation biases that might arise in measuring such impacts. I use PSM to estimate the 
effect of parental death on a child’s wellbeing outcomes, without needing to randomly assign 
parental death as a treatment to children. I use the existing IHDS data and estimate the effect of 
parental death on a child’s workforce participation, education, marital status and health, and a 
household’s consumption per capita. I look at the difference in effects from the loss of a mother 
versus the loss of a father, as well as the difference between effects on girls versus on boys. On 
average, I find, as one might expect, that parental death leads to worse outcomes on most of my 
chosen wellbeing indicators, and a parent’s death has a larger and more negative effective on a 
daughter’s outcomes than on a son’s. I lastly find that a mother passing away, on average, leads to 
worse outcomes for children on some indicators, while a father passing away leads to worse 













Age	 10.23	 26,056.00	 8.03	 367,726.00	
#	of	People	in	HH	 6.89	 17,548.00	 6.96	 318,712.00	
Female	 0.40	 1,010.00	 0.43	 19,803.00	
Deceased	Mother	 0.27	 685.00	 0.00	 0.00	
Deceased	Father	 0.75	 1,909.00	 0.00	 0.00	
#	of	HH	Assets	 11.11	 28,282.00	 11.54	 528,453.00	
Main	HH	Income	Source:	Hazardous	
Occup.	
0.63	 1,602.00	 0.62	 28,590.00	
Mother's	Morbidity	Scale	 0.11	 276.00	 0.07	 3,125.00	
Father's	Morbidity	Scale	 0.15	 384.00	 0.05	 2,443.00	
Mother	Tobacco/Alcohol	Use	 0.11	 276.00	 0.07	 3,418.00	
Father	Tobacco/Alcohol	Use	 0.66	 1,686.00	 0.55	 25,214.00	
HH	Debt	Per	Capita	 3,457.55	 8,802,914.46	 2,953.62	 135,293,471.37	
Mother	Age	 37.76	 96,138.00	 32.54	 1,490,609.00	
Father	Age	 43.50	 110,755.00	 37.53	 1,719,033.00	
Education	Level	(Self)	 3.72	 9,461.00	 2.72	 124,491.00	
Mother	Education	Level	 4.24	 9,656.00	 3.52	 137,051.00	
Father	Education	Level	 5.47	 13,437.00	 4.44	 192,840.00	
Urban	HH	 0.31	 792.00	 0.29	 13,258.00	
Drinking	Water	Source	Within	Home	 0.49	 1,236.00	 0.50	 23,007.00	
Sanitation	Index	 1.83	 4,670.00	 1.85	 84,920.00	
Have	Electricity	 0.74	 1,873.00	 0.75	 34,167.00	
Medical	Treatment	Available	Nearby	 0.07	 189.00	 0.10	 4,644.00	
Death	in	HH	in	Past	Year	 0.04	 92.00	 0.04	 1,846.00	
Monthly	Consumption	Per	Capita	 1,300.79	 3,311,818.81	 1,306.21	 59,832,193.84	
Religion:	Hindu	 0.78	 1,993.00	 0.79	 36,390.00	
Religion:	Muslim	 0.14	 363.00	 0.15	 6,671.00	
Caste:	Brahmin	 0.04	 91.00	 0.04	 2,051.00	
Caste:	OBC	or	Dalit	 0.54	 1,387.00	 0.56	 25,560.00	
















Age	 9.49	 6,502.00	 10.50	 20,039.00	
#	of	People	in	HH	 7.26	 4,970.00	 6.76	 12,909.00	
Female	 0.42	 286.00	 0.39	 743.00	
Deceased	Mother	 1.00	 685.00	 0.03	 48.00	
Deceased	Father	 0.07	 48.00	 1.00	 1,909.00	
#	of	HH	Assets	 10.81	 7,407.00	 11.19	 21,363.00	
Main	HH	Income	Source:	Hazardous	
Occup.	
0.69	 472.00	 0.61	 1,157.00	
Mother's	Morbidity	Scale	 0.21	 141.00	 0.07	 141.00	
Father's	Morbidity	Scale	 0.04	 30.00	 0.19	 358.00	
Mother	Tobacco/Alcohol	Use	 0.12	 85.00	 0.10	 200.00	
Father	Tobacco/Alcohol	Use	 0.61	 417.00	 0.68	 1,301.00	
HH	Debt	Per	Capita	 2,338.21	 1,601,675.36	 3,798.21	 7,250,776.39	
Mother	Age	 36.55	 25,035.00	 38.29	 73,097.00	
Father	Age	 41.02	 28,096.00	 44.50	 84,959.00	
Education	Level	(Self)	 3.19	 2,182.00	 3.90	 7,436.00	
Mother	Education	Level	 3.65	 2,178.00	 4.45	 7,673.00	
Father	Education	Level	 5.05	 3,272.00	 5.61	 10,412.00	
Urban	HH	 0.26	 179.00	 0.33	 635.00	
Drinking	Water	Source	Within	Home	 0.47	 324.00	 0.49	 933.00	
Sanitation	Index	 1.77	 1,215.00	 1.86	 3,556.00	
Have	Electricity	 0.73	 503.00	 0.73	 1,403.00	
Medical	Treatment	Available	Nearby	 0.06	 38.00	 0.08	 156.00	
Death	in	HH	in	Past	Year	 0.05	 36.00	 0.03	 62.00	
Monthly	Consumption	Per	Capita	 1,259.19	 862,546.89	 1,309.37	 2,499,578.16	
Religion:	Hindu	 0.79	 542.00	 0.78	 1,490.00	
Religion:	Muslim	 0.16	 109.00	 0.14	 261.00	
Caste:	Brahmin	 0.04	 28.00	 0.03	 63.00	
Caste:	OBC	or	Dalit	 0.55	 374.00	 0.55	 1,045.00	




























	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.treatment	 -2.92	 0.08***	 -0.08***	 -0.34***	 139.90	 -0.02***	 0.14	
	 (50.71)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.10)	 (542.98)	 (0.01)	 (0.09)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.treatment	 26.96	 0.06***	 -0.08***	 -0.47***	 850.91	 -0.02*	 0.29**	
	 (53.42)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.11)	 (1096.54)	 (0.01)	 (0.09)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Mother	
-25.51	 0.06*	 -0.07**	 -0.52**	 -1994.69***	 -0.02	 0.07	
	 (138.79)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.19)	 (444.56)	 (0.01)	 (0.14)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Mother	
-63.76	 0.08**	 -0.08**	 -0.57**	 -726.07	 -0.02	 0.11	
	 (95.85)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.20)	 (871.23)	 (0.02)	 (0.17)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Father	
51.28	 0.04**	 -0.05***	 -0.29*	 1309.42	 -0.01	 0.09	
	 (59.82)	 (0.02)	 (0.01)	 (0.13)	 (1623.45)	 (0.01)	 (0.12)	



















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Father	
73.26	 0.05**	 -0.07***	 -0.39**	 22.20	 -0.03*	 0.14	
	 (63.00)	 (0.02)	 (0.01)	 (0.13)	 (1699.72)	 (0.01)	 (0.11)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Mother	
-54.93	 0.01	 -0.06	 0.15	 -2624.53	 -0.02	 0.05	
	 (132.62)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.20)	 (1494.36)	 (0.02)	 (0.19)	















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Mother	
-473.81**	 0.09**	 -0.09**	 -0.64**	 -759.04	 -0.05**	 0.26	
	 (153.28)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.24)	 (2575.81)	 (0.02)	 (0.19)	














	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Father	
34.23	 0.01	 0.01	 -0.54*	 2300.20	 0.02	 0.02	
	 (128.80)	 (0.03)	 (0.04)	 (0.26)	 (2896.12)	 (0.02)	 (0.23)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.Deceased	
Father	
-149.58	 0.04	 -0.02	 -0.96**	 1811.11	 0.01	 0.07	
	 (140.24)	 (0.04)	 (0.05)	 (0.32)	 (1696.95)	 (0.02)	 (0.27)	
	 29	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.ftreatment	 -92.18	 -0.00	 -0.04*	 -0.16	 -664.58	 0.02*	 0.28	
	 (71.72)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.17)	 (548.66)	 (0.01)	 (0.14)	
















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
ATET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
r1vs0.ftreatment	 -72.45	 -0.08***	 -0.05*	 -0.29	 -1138.83	 0.02	 -0.04	
	 (91.89)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.18)	 (718.48)	 (0.01)	 (0.17)	















	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	 b/(SE)	
treatment	 35.83	 0.06***	 -0.06***	 -0.52***	 1107.36*	 -0.02**	 0.15*	
	 (43.92)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.06)	 (534.47)	 (0.01)	 (0.07)	
txdeceasedmother1	 -88.65	 0.02	 -0.05**	 -0.08	 -2150.63*	 -0.02	 -0.01	
	 (82.89)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.12)	 (1035.15)	 (0.01)	 (0.14)	
Age	 53.77***	 0.03***	 -0.00	 1.13***	 -649.11***	 0.02***	 -0.02*	
	 (6.66)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.01)	 (73.61)	 (0.00)	 (0.01)	
agesquared1	 -2.66***	 0.00***	 -0.00***	 -0.04***	 90.47***	 -0.00***	 0.00	
	 (0.36)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (4.68)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	
#	of	People	in	HH	 -44.81***	 0.00***	 -0.00***	 -0.10***	 -210.81***	 -0.00***	 -0.02***	
	 (3.07)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (31.25)	 (0.00)	 (0.01)	
Female	 -95.01***	 -0.13***	 0.01***	 0.29***	 -1077.43***	 0.03***	 0.13***	
	 (17.45)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	 (177.69)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	
#	of	HH	Assets	 93.30***	 -0.01***	 0.01***	 0.12***	 594.08***	 0.00	 -0.01**	




-24.96	 0.05***	 -0.03***	 -0.03	 103.36	 -0.01***	 -0.05	
	 (21.08)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	 (217.45)	 (0.00)	 (0.04)	
Mother's	Morbidity	
Scale	
-28.43	 -0.01	 0.00	 -0.15**	 59.91	 0.00	 0.10	
	 (32.64)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.05)	 (356.57)	 (0.00)	 (0.05)	
Father's	Morbidity	
Scale	
85.32*	 -0.02*	 0.01	 0.04	 299.53	 0.00	 0.16**	
	 (36.04)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.05)	 (394.96)	 (0.00)	 (0.06)	
Mother	
Tobacco/Alcohol	Use	
-136.22***	 -0.03***	 -0.04***	 -0.23***	 730.70*	 0.01**	 -0.13*	




-53.31**	 0.02***	 -0.03***	 -0.28***	 -896.39***	 -0.01***	 0.05	
	 (18.19)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	 (187.17)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	
HH	Debt	Per	Capita	 0.00**	 -0.00*	 -0.00	 0.00	 -0.00	 -0.00	 0.00	
	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.01)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	
Mother	Age	 6.54*	 0.01***	 -0.00***	 -0.08***	 -67.80*	 -0.00***	 0.02**	
	 (2.83)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (30.68)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	
Father	Age	 -4.19	 -0.00***	 -0.00	 0.00	 37.82	 0.00***	 -0.01**	
	 (2.48)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (26.82)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	
Mother	Education	
Level	
17.86***	 -0.00***	 0.00***	 0.12***	 41.84	 0.01***	 0.00	
	 (3.05)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (32.46)	 (0.00)	 (0.01)	
Father	Education	
Level	 31.10
***	 -0.01***	 0.01***	 0.23***	 92.45**	 0.00***	 -0.01*	
	 (2.98)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (32.24)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	
Urban	HH	 -73.34**	 -0.10***	 -0.04***	 -0.42***	 -61.28	 0.02***	 -0.02	
	 (22.62)	 (0.01)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	 (235.08)	 (0.00)	 (0.04)	
Drinking	Water	
Source	Within	Home	
-35.17	 -0.02***	 0.02***	 -0.19***	 -162.63	 0.01**	 0.11**	
	 (19.79)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	 (205.13)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	
Sanitation	Index	 38.10**	 -0.03***	 0.01***	 -0.03	 46.68	 0.01***	 -0.00	
	 (14.12)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.02)	 (147.89)	 (0.00)	 (0.02)	
Have	Electricity	 -81.17***	 -0.00	 -0.01*	 0.36***	 -1798.31***	 0.01*	 -0.25***	
	 (23.95)	 (0.01)	 (0.00)	 (0.03)	 (254.07)	 (0.00)	 (0.04)	
Medical	Treatment	
Available	Nearby	
-72.34*	 -0.03***	 0.02***	 0.08	 -344.38	 0.00	 0.30***	
	 (29.52)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.04)	 (283.07)	 (0.00)	 (0.05)	
Death	in	HH	in	Past	
Year	
-33.68	 0.02	 -0.01	 -0.14*	 -90.33	 -0.00	 0.01	
	 (44.51)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.06)	 (457.13)	 (0.01)	 (0.07)	
Monthly	Consumption	
Per	Capita	
0.30***	 -0.00	 0.00***	 0.00***	 1.45***	 -0.00	 0.00	
	 (0.01)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.10)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	
Constant	 423.10***	 0.11***	 1.02***	 1.45***	 -165.02	 0.92***	 1.39***	
	 (63.22)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.09)	 (670.60)	 (0.01)	 (0.11)	
R-Squared	 0.20	 0.29	 0.41	 0.61	 0.16	 0.22	 0.01	
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